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Bankruptcy
by W. Homer Drake, Jr.*
and
Michael M. Duclos*
I.

INTRODUCTION

During 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit decided seventeen cases in the area of bankruptcy law. These
decisions covered a wide variety of issues arising under the Bankruptcy
Code,1 and one decision even concerned a case under the old Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 ("Bankruptcy Act"). 2 This article is a survey of the
bankruptcy decisions rendered by the Eleventh Circuit in 1995.
II.

DISPOSITION OF SURPLUS FUNDS

The Eleventh Circuit was faced with the unique problem of deciding
the disposition of unclaimed funds stemming from a Chapter XI case
under the old Bankruptcy Act in Georgian Villa, Inc. v. United States
(In re GeorgianVilla, Inc.).' The debtor Georgian Villa, Inc., a nonprofit

corporation which had built and operated a hospital, filed for bankruptcy
under the Bankruptcy Act in 1977. While in bankruptcy, its property
was sold at a price in excess of the corporation's debt.6 Once all
* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Northern District of Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A, 1954; L.L.B., 1956). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable Lewis R. Morgan, Senior Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Emory University (B.A., 1989); University of Georgia
(J.D., 1993). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. f§ 101-1330 (1988) and in various sections of Title 28 of
the United States Code).
2. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
3. Id.
4. 55 F.3d 1561 (11th Cir. 1995).
5. Id. at 1561.
6. Id.
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administrative costs and previously undiscovered claims had been
satisfied, a surplus of approximately $300,000 remained. During the
pendency of the case, Georgian Villa remained dormant, but reactivated
itself in 1991.8 In 1992, it filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for
payment of the surplus funds to the debtor in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 2042. 9 The bankruptcy court, finding that Georgian Villa was no
longer a viable corporation due to its period of dormancy and lack of
shareholders, exercised its equitable powers and ordered that the
surplus funds be paid into the treasury of the United
States. 0
11
Georgian Villa appealed, but the district court affirmed.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the purpose of the bankruptcy system,
at least under the Bankruptcy Act, 2 was to make the debtor's property
available to its creditors, while returning to the debtor any surplus that
may remain at the end.'" The court also pointed out that under the
former 11 U.S.C. § 106,"' a bankruptcy court was to disburse surplus
funds in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2042.'5 In effect, section 2042
stated that any claimant entitled to unclaimed funds could petition a
court to direct payment of such funds." Georgian Villa relied upon
these statutory provisions to argue it was entitled to the money. 7 In
contrast, the United States claimed that the bankruptcy court properly

7.

Id. at 1561-62.

8. Id. at 1562.
9. Id. Section 2042 provides in pertinent part:
No money deposited under section 2041 of this title shall be withdrawn except by
order of court. In every case in which the right to withdraw money deposited in
court under section 2041 has been adjudicated or is not in dispute and such money

has remained so deposited for at least five years unclaimed by the person entitled
thereto, such court shall cause such money to be deposited in the Treasury in the
name and to the credit of the United States. Any claimant entitled to any such
money may, on petition to the court and upon notice to the United States Attorney
and full proof of the right thereto, obtain an order directing payment to him.
28 U.S.C. § 2042 (1994).
10. 55 F.3d at 1562.
11. Id.
12. Because Georgian Villa's bankruptcy case was administered under the Bankruptcy
Act, the Eleventh Circuit relied primarily on the law and commentary that existed prior
to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in making its decision in this case. Id. at 156364.
13.

Id. at 1562 (quoting 3A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY

1971)).
14.
15.
16.
17.

11 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (prior to 1994 amendment).
55 F.3d at 1562.
28 U.S.C. § 2042.
55 F.3d at 1562.

66.03, at 2328 n.8 (14th ed.
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exercised its equitable jurisdiction to prevent those persons controlling
Georgian Villa from receiving a windfall.'"
The Eleventh Circuit was unpersuaded by the government's argument.
The use of a bankruptcy court's equitable powers to disregard the
corporate entity and distribute unclaimed funds to another party is
appropriate only in situations where the corporate debtor is no longer in
existence. 9 Such was not the case with Georgian Villa. Under Georgia
law, a corporation's certificate of existence constitutes prima facie
evidence that the corporation continues to exist. 0 Georgian Villa had
such a certificate, and the court found absolutely nothing in the record
to rebut the evidence of its existence.2 '
The fact that Georgian Villa lay dormant for well over a decade was
of no consequence to the Eleventh Circuit.22 As all of the corporate
assets were in the hands of the bankruptcy trustee, "Georgian Villa had
little choice but to lay dormant until the resolution of its Chapter XI
proceedings."23 Once the case had been flly administered, however,
Georgian Villa was entitled to receive the remaining funds and resume
operations.'
III. CLAIMS: IDENTIFYING FUTURE CLAIMANTS
The Eleventh Circuit was faced with the problem of defining what
constitutes a "claim" within the meaning of section 101(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code25 in the case of Epstein v. Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.). 6 Piper Aircraft was
a manufacturer and distributor of general aviation aircraft and parts.27
After it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court appointed
David G. Epstein as the legal representative of the class of future
claimants who might assert postconfirmation product liability claims

18. Id. Obviously, the United States was not concerned about the "windfall" the
government would receive if the surplus funds were to be paid into the treasury.
19. Id. at 1563.
20. Id. (citing to O.C.G.A. § 14-2-128 (1994)).
21. Id.
22. Id
23. Id. The Eleventh Circuit panel seems to have viewed the reasoning of the
bankruptcy and district courts as having put Georgian Villa into a catch-22 situation.
According to the lower courts, Georgian Villa needed to be an active corporation in order
to be entitled to the surplus funds. Unfortunately, Georgian Villa first needed the surplus
funds before it could once again be an active corporation.

24. Id.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1993).
26. 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
27. Id. at 1575.
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against Piper Aircraft. 28 Epstein then filed a proof of claim on behalf
of the future claimants in the amount of $100,000,000, after which the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and Piper Aircraft filed
objections. 29 They objected on the ground that the future claimants did
not hold section 101(5) claims against Piper Aircraft. 0 The bankruptcy
court sustained the objections,"' and the district court affirmed.32
On Epstein's further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit had to decide what
test to use to determine whether a party holds a claim pursuant to
section 101(5). Epstein argued for the application of the "conduct" test,
under which "a right to payment arises when the conduct giving rise to
the alleged liability occurred." 3 Under this view, the conduct giving
rise to claims would be Piper Aircraft's prepetition manufacture, design,
and sale of allegedly defective aircraft."' Since Piper Aircraft performed these acts prepetition, all potential victims, even though
currently unidentifiable, would be future claimants holding claims
pursuant to section 101(5).3' The Committee and Piper Aircraft
rejected this view, as did the bankruptcy and district courts, and argued
in favor of the "prepetition relationship" test instead." This test
"requires some prepetition relationship, such as contact, exposure,
impact, or privity, between the debtor's prepetition conduct and the
claimant in order for the claimant to hold a § 101(5) claim."3 7 Under
this test, future claimants would not hold a claim, since they had no
prepetition contact with Piper Aircraft."
After considering both views, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the
lower courts had properly applied the "prepetition relationship" test.39
Nevertheless, the court was not completely satisfied with the adoption

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, 168 B.R. 434
(S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
32. Epstein v. Official Comm. Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 168 B.R.
434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995).
33. 58 F.3d at 1576-77.
34. Id. at 1577.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. It is worth noting that some courts have used a third "accrued state law claim" test
to determine the existence of a claim under section 101(5). This theory states that no claim
exists in bankruptcy until it has accrued under state law. Although no party espoused
such a view in this case, the Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected it. Id. at 1576 n.2.
39. Id. at 1577.
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of this view, concluding that some modification was necessary to reflect
claims arising postpetition but prior to confirmation:
We therefore modify the test used by the district court and adopt
what we call the "Piper test" in determining the scope of the term
claim under § 101(5): an individual has a § 101(5) claim against a
debtor manufacturer if (i) events occurring before confirmation create
a relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact, or privity, between
the claimant and the debtor's product; and (ii) the basis for liability is
the debtor's prepetition conduct in designing, manufacturing and
selling the allegedly defective or dangerous product.'
Under this test, the future claimants in PiperAircraft failed to present
a claim recognizable in bankruptcy because there was no preconfirmation relationship with or exposure to Piper Aircraft and its allegedly
defective products. 1 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
result reached by the lower courts.4 2
IV. THE AUTOMATIC STAY AND ADEQUATE PROTECTION PAYMENTS
The Eleventh Circuit reached an important decision affecting the
rights of oversecured creditors in Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Delta
Resources, Inc. (In re Delta Resources, Inc.).' It concluded that an
oversecured creditor was not entitled to receive periodic cash payments
for accruing postpetition interest as part of adequate protection under
section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy, Code" in order to preserve the
Orix Credit Alliance, an oversecured
value of its equity cushion.'
creditor of the Chapter 11 debtor Delta Resources, had obtained an order
from the district court that it was entitled to receive such interest
payments.4 6 The district court reached this result by relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in United Savings Association v. Timbers of
Inwood ForestsAssociates, Ltd., v which held that section 506(b) of the

40. Id. This modified test was, in fact, enunciated by the bankruptcy court in another
decision arising from the Piper Aircraft bankruptcy. Id. at 1577 n.5 (citing In re Piper
Aircraft Corp., 169 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994)).
41. Id. at 1578.
42. Id.
43. 54 F.3d 722 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 488 (1995).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 362(dXl) (1993). Under this provision, a creditor may obtain relief from

the automatic stay for lack of adequate protection of the creditor's interest in its collateral.
Id.
45. 54 F.3d at 730.
46. Id. at 725. The bankruptcy court had concluded that Orix was entitled to receive
only payments reflecting the collateral's depreciation. Id. at 724.
47. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
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Bankruptcy Code48 authorized postpetition interest payments to
oversecured creditors only.49
The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court. 0 While
it agreed that an oversecured creditor had the right to receive postpetition interest on its claim under section 506(b), the court noted that
determination of a creditor's secured status comes near the end of a
bankruptcy case while the matter of adequate protection is made at the
inception of the case."' With this in mind, the court concluded that:
11 U.S.C. § 506(b), providing for postpetition interest on oversecured
claims, read in pari materia with 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), concerning
conditioning the automatic stay on adequate protection, and 11 U.S.C.
§ 502, regarding the allowance of claims, requires that the payment of
accrued postpetition interest to an oversecured creditor await the
completion of reorganization or confirmation of the bankruptcy case.52
Consequently, an oversecured creditor is not entitled to postpetition
interest payments as adequate protection for its interest in collateral.
Adequate protection of a creditor's interest in property as authorized in
section 362(d)(1) encompasses the decline in the value of the collateral
only."3 It does not, as the district court held, require protection of the
creditor's interest in maintaining its equity cushion."
V.

DISCHARGE AND DISCHARGEABILITY

A.

Tax Liabilities
55 the Eleventh Circuit visited
In the case of Haas v. IRS (In re Haas),
the issue of whether, pursuant to section 523(a)(1)(C) of the Bankruptcy
Code," certain federal taxes owed by a debtor were excepted from
discharge. 7 Thomas Haas had failed to pay his income and employment taxes owed to the Internal Revenue Service between 1977 and

48. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1993).
49. 54 F.3d at 716 (citing 484 U.S. at 372-73).
50. Id. at 730.
51. Id. at 729-30.
52. Id. at 730.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 523(aXl)(C) (1993). The provision excepts from discharge any tax debt
"with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any
manner to evade or defeat such tax." Id.
57. 48 F.3d at 1154.
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1985."8 While he filed accurate tax returns for the years in issue, he
chose instead to pay his personal and business debts rather than his
taxes.69 Once in bankruptcy, Haas commenced an adversary proceeding seeking a determination of the dischargeability of his federal tax
liabilities.' The bankruptcy court found that Haas' failure to pay the
taxes did not amount to an affirmative attempt to evade or defeat the
taxes."' On appeal, however, the district court reversed, 2 concluding
in the process that Haas' knowing failure to pay the taxes constituted a
willful attempt to evade and defeat his federal tax liabilities."
Because the facts of the case were virtually undisputed, the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Haas turned on the legal interpretation of the
The IRS argued that the plain
meaning of section 523(a)(1)(C)."
meaning of the phrase "willfully attempted in any manner to evade or
defeat such tax" encompasses a debtor's knowing and willing failure
to pay his tax liabilities.66 The Eleventh Circuit, however, found this
plain meaning interpretation problematic, since it would result in
virtually all tax debts being nondischargeable."7 As a result, the
exception of section 523(a)(1)(C) would "swallow the general rule"
allowing the discharge of tax liabilities." Furthermore, it would
contravene the Bankruptcy Code's purpose of allowing a fresh start to
the honest but unfortunate debtor.69

58. Id.
59.

Id.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. In re Haas, 173 B.R. 756 (S.D. Ala. 1993), rev'd, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995).
63. 173 B.R. at 759.
64. 48 F.3d at 1155.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C).
66. 48 F.3d at 1155.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1155-56.
69. Id. at 1156 (citing to Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 285 (1991), and In re Miller,
39 F.3d 301, 304 (11th Cir, 1994)). With respect to a debtor's honesty, the court notes as
follows:
Under the IRS's interpretation of section 523(a)(1)(C), the only honest debtor
would be a debtor who is wholly unaware of her debt to the IRS. However, she
is also an honest debtor who, fully cognizant of the debt that she owes to the IRS,
uses her income to pay other debts instead. Her failure to pay the IRS is the
result of not dishonesty but of the defining characteristic of all debtors-honest
and dishonest, alike--insufficient resources to honor all of her obligations ....
That [Haas] decided to use his limited funds to satisfy obligations other than his
properly acknowledged income taxes does not render him a dishonest debtor,
simply a debtor.
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Having concluded that the IRS's plain meaning argument would
subvert the purposes underlying the Bankruptcy Code, the court in Haas
undertook an analysis of relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code to interpret the ambiguity left by section 523(a)(1)(C). As a result
of its search, the court found four places in the tax code where Congress
had made a distinction between evasion of a tax and evasion of payment
of a tax.70 These tax provisions were virtually identical in language to
section 523(a)(1)(C) in that they made references to willfully attempting
in any manner to evade or defeat the particular tax. Unlike section
523(a)(1)(C), however, the tax provisions added the phrase "or payment
thereof."7 ' The addition of this phrase was critical. It showed that
Congress knew how to include language in a law to make it applicable
to the payment of the tax itself, as compared to merely evading or
defeating the tax. 72 Because the language of section 523(a)(1)(C) makes
reference only to attempts to evade or defeat the tax, the Eleventh
Circuit declined to conclude that Congress intended the. failure to pay
taxes, without more, would also result in the debt being excepted from
discharge.7"
Later in the year, the Eleventh Circuit once again addressed a tax
dispute within the context of bankruptcy in the case of United States v.
Ryan (In re Ryan).74 Alvin and Sandra Ryan overpaid their income
taxes for 1990 and requested that the IRS. apply the overpayment to
cover their unpaid taxes for 1989. 75 Contrary to the Ryans' wishes,
however, the IRS applied the overpayment to their 1986 liability.7"
After the Ryans filed for bankruptcy, they commenced an adversary
proceeding to force the IRS to apply the excess 1990 tax funds to their
1989 liability.77 The Ryans argued that under the "voluntary payment

Id. As this passage shows, the Eleventh Circuit is careful to distinguish being in debt from

being dishonest.
70. 48 F.2d at 1156. The provisions of the tax code are 26 U.S.C. §§ 6531(2) (1989),

6653 (1995), 6672 (1995), and 7201 (1989).
71. 48 F.3d at 1156 (quoting language of pertinent sections of tax code).
72. Id. at 1156-57. The court in Haas recognized that the similar sections of the tax
code and section 523(a)(1XC) were not part of the same title or statute. "Nevertheless, the
omissions or inclusions in the former are relevant to our construction of the latter because
Congress is presumed to be aware of pertinent, existing law when it passes legislation."
Id. at 1157 (citing to Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30 (1990), and Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184-85 (1988)).
73. Id. at 1157.
74. 64 F.3d 1516 (11th Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 1518.
76. Id.
77. Id. In filing their adversary complaint, the Ryans sought a declaration that their
1986, 1987, and 1988 tax liabilities were discharged in their bankruptcy case. They

1996]

BANKRUPTCY

725

rule," the IRS must apply the 1990 overpayment as -directed by the
Ryans7 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. The voluntary payment rule
applied only in cases where a debtor makes a voluntary partial payment
on assessed tax liability."' The Ryans had not made a "partial payment" but instead had made an "overpayment." Such a distinction was
important because under section 6402 of the tax code, 0 the IRS is
given the discretion to apply an overpayment as it sees fit."' Thus, the
IRS acted within its authority in applying the Ryans' 1990 overpayment
to their 1986 liability, thereby making the Ryans liable for their 1989
unpaid income taxes.8 2
Fraud:The Standard of Reliance
In the case of City Bank & Trust Co. v. Vann (In re Vann)," the
Eleventh Circuit answered the question of what standard of reliance a
creditor must satisfy in a section 523(a)(2)(A)" fraud dischargeability
proceeding. In 1985, Edwin L. Vann entered into negotiations for a
loan with City Bank & Trust." Vann initially provided the bank with
information about his financial situation but, as negotiations went on,
Vann's financial situation deteriorated. 7 Nevertheless, Vann failed to
update the bank on his finances, nor did the bank make any further
inquiries.' The parties eventually closed the loan, and later Vann filed
The bank responded to the
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.'
B.

admitted, however, that any 1989 liability would be excepted from discharge under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A), because it became due within three years before the filing of their
bankruptcy petition. Their overpayment of taxes in 1990 exceeded the amount they owed
for 1989. Thus, if the court forced the IRS to apply the overpayment to cover the Ryans'
failure to pay in 1989, there would be no income tax debt remaining for 1989. Id. at 151718.
78. Id. at 1523. Under the IRS's own "voluntary payment rule," the taxpayer may
direct how the payment is to be applied by the IRS. Id.
79. Id. at 1522-23.
80. 26 U.S.C. § 6402 (1995). This statute states in relevant part that "the Secretary
... may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest allowed thereon,
against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of the person who
made the overpayment." Id.
81. 64 F.3d at 1523.
82. Id. at 1524.
83. 67 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1995).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1993). This provision excepts from a debtor's discharge
any debt obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud." Id.
85. 67 F.3d at 277.
86. Id. at 279.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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bankruptcy by commencing an adversary proceeding seeking to have its
claim declared excepted from Vann's discharge for fraud under section
523(a)(2)(A), arguing that Vann had fraudulently concealed the true
nature of his finances.9 0 The bankruptcy. court, with the district court
later affirming, concluded that under the provisions of this section, the
creditor must prove that it reasonably relied on the debtor's representations, but that the bank failed to meet that standard."1
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed after concluding that
the lower courts had held the bank to the wrong standard of reliance.92
The court reached this conclusion by first considering the statutory
language of section 523(a)(2). Significant was the fact that subsection
(B) of this section requires that a creditor's reliance be reasonable,9" but
no such mention of reasonable reliance is made in subsection (A)." The
court then deduced from the exclusion of the reasonable reliance
standard in subsection (A) that Congress intended that a standard
different from that in subsection (B) apply.95 Because the legislative
history was silent as to what standard should apply in 523(a)(2)(A), the
court looked to common law." Under common law, a victim of fraud
is entitled to recovery if his reliance on the debtor's misrepresentations
was justifiable.9 7 The justifiable reliance standard is a more subjective
approach than reasonable reliance in that it looks to the creditor's "'own
capacity and the knowledge which he has, or which may fairly be
charged against him from the facts within his observation in the light
of his individual case."
In view of this common law approach, the
Eleventh Circuit adopted the justifiable reliance standard for section
523(a)(2)(A) fraud discharge cases. 9 Because this standard is more
90.
91.

Id.
Id.

92. Id. at 284.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1993). This subsection excepts from a debtor's
discharge debts incurred through the use of false financial statements, and it specifically
requires that the creditor's reliance on the statement be reasonable. Id.
94. 67 F.3d at 281.
95. Id. at 282.
96.

Id.

97, Id. at 283 (citing to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977) and W. PAGE
KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 108, at 749 (5th ed. 1984)).
98. Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 108, at 751 (5th ed.
1984)).
99. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the circuit courts are split on this question and
use three standards of reliance: (1) reasonable reliance, (2) justifiable reliance, and (3)
actual reliance. Id. at 280. Eight months after the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in
Vann, the Supreme Court resolved the conflict among the circuits by concluding that the
justifiable reliance standard applies to section 523(aX2)(A) cases. Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct.
437 (1995).
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lenient than the reasonable reliance standard applied by-the bankruptcy
court, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for further fact finding on
the issue of justifiable reliance."°
Because section 523(a)(2)(A) provides the basis for one of the most
common exceptions to a debtor's discharge, the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Vann is rather significant. The case is particularly interesting, too, in that the Eleventh Circuit, which normally construes
exceptions to discharge narrowly to favor the debtor, adopted a lower
standard of reliance that will make it easier for creditors to except debts
from discharge.
C. Fraud:The Preclusive Effect of PriorDefault Judgment
One of the more significant bankruptcy cases decided by the Eleventh
Circuit in 1995 was Bush v. Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. (In re
Bush).' ' The issue presented in that case was whether a default
judgment based upon allegations of fraud could be used to conclusively
establish the elements of fraud in a bankruptcy discharge proceeding. 10 2 In 1989, Balfour filed a multicount complaint in federal district
court, containing one count claiming fraud, against Freddie M. Bush. 3
Bush answered the complaint, but after repeated failures on his part to
comply with court orders and discovery requests, the district court
entered default judgment on all counts, including the fraud claim, in
favor of Balfour." 4 Several months later, on November 7, 1991, Bush
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.0 5 An adversary proceeding
ensued in which Balfour sought to have its judgment debt declared
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(2)(A) as a debt for money
obtained by fraud."° Balfour filed for summary judgment, arguing
that the prior judgment had preclusive effect on the issue of fraud. 7
Bush countered that there was no preclusive effect of the prior judgment
because it had been entered by default.'
Both the bankruptcy and
district courts concluded that the default judgment prevented Bush from
denying fraud in the dischargeability proceeding."o

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

67 F.3d at 284.
62 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1321.
Id.
Id. at 1322.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The basis of Bush's argument before the Eleventh Circuit was that the
issue of fraud was not actually litigated in the prior court proceeding
because a default judgment had been entered. 10 In order for a
previous judgment to have preclusive effect in a later proceeding, the
issue in question must have been actually litigated."' The Eleventh
Circuit noted that as a general matter, a default judgment will not
support the application of issue preclusion precisely because the issue
was not actually litigated."2 This general rule, however, has its
limits, as Bush demonstrates. In Bush's case, judgment by default was
entered against him as a sanction for his failure to comply with court
orders and discovery requests."'
Unlike cases where default is
entered for a party's failure to make an appearance in a law suit, Bush
actively participated in the prior action for an extended period of
time."4 Where a party substantially participated in an action in
which he had a full and fair opportunity to defend on the merits, issue
preclusion would apply to a later proceeding, even where the first action
was concluded by a default judgment."' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
prevented Bush from taking advantage of his misconduct in the prior
court action through his efforts to frustrate and complicate the later
bankruptcy dischargeability proceeding.
D. Willful and Malicious Injury
In Hope v. Walker (In re Walker),"6 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the issue of an employer's failure to obtain workers' compensation
insurance, concluding that such failure did not give rise to a willful and
malicious injury"' Frank Hope suffered a work related injury while
in the employ of Keith Walker."' Thereafter, Hope received an award
of $27,939.41 from the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation

110. Id.
111. Issue preclusion, traditionally known as collateral estoppel, requires the following
elements: (1) the issue in the prior and present action must be identical; (2) the issue was

actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action
was a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that litigation; and (4) the burden of
persuasion in the present action must not be significantly heavier than the burden of
persuasion in the prior action. Id. The only element at issue in Bush was the second one,

and there was no dispute that the other three elements had been satisfied.
112. 62 F.3d at 1323.
113. Id. at 1324. The district court in the prior litigation entered judgment by default
against Bush under FED. R. Ciw. P. 37.
114. 62 F.3d at 1324.
115. Id. at 1325.
116. 48 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 1995).
117. Id. at 1164-65.
118. Id. at 1163.
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for his injuries."1
Unfortunately, Walker did not maintain workers'
compensation insurance, 20 and after paying only a fraction of the
award, he filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 2 ' Hope commenced an
adversary proceeding against Walker, arguing that his workers'
compensation award should be declared nondischargeable under section
523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.'
The bankruptcy court ruled in
favor of Walker by finding the debt dischargeable, and on appeal the
district court affirmed."2
The fact was undisputed that Walker willfully failed to procure
workers' compensation insurance. 24 Nevertheless, the critical issue
for the court was whether an intentional and deliberate act could
constitute a willful and malicious injury for the purposes of section
523(a)(6).' 25 The majority of the circuits have strictly construed the
language of section 523(a)(6) to require that the debtor either intend the
resulting injury or take intentional action that is substantially certain
to cause an injury. Finding this majority view persuasive, the Eleventh
Circuit stated as follows:
We follow our sister courts in concluding that, in order to be "willful"

under section 523(a)(6), the debtor must have intended more than
merely the act that results in injury. Congress has been very clear in
expressing its intention in section 523(a)(6). The plain language of
section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge debts arising from "willful and
malicious injury" rather than "willful and malicious acts which cause
an injury .... " Mindful of our obligation to construe strictly excep-

tions to discharge in order to give effect to the fresh start policy of the
Bankruptcy Code, ... we hold that section 523(a)(6) requires a
deliberate or intentional injury" 6

119. Id.
120. Id. Walker was required under Georgia law to maintain workers' compensation
insurance for Hope who was a subcontractor. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-8 (1992). Nevertheless, he
did not do so because he was under the mistaken impression that he was not the general
contractor for the construction project and thought that Hope was responsible for securing
his own insurance. 48 F.3d at 1163.
121. 48 F.3d at 1163.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1993). Under this provision of the Bankruptcy Code, a
discharge does not relieve the debtor of any debt "for willful and malicious injury by the
debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." Id.
123. 48 F.3d at 1163.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1164.
126. Id. (quoting Eaves v. Hampel (In re Hampel), 110 B.R. 88, 93 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1990)).
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Thus, the ultimate focus of a section 523(a)(6) willful and malicious
inquiry is not the act that causes the injury, but the injury itself.
After clarifying that the intent requirement encompassed not only the
desired consequences of an act but also the consequences that are
substantially certain to result, 2 7 the court in Walker turned to the
facts of the case. In so doing, it concluded that the physical injury Hope
suffered was not substantially certain to result from the failure of
Walker to procure workers' compensation insurance. 2 ' Walker's
failure to have the insurance did not cause "an unbroken chain of
events" that led to the actual injury suffered by Hope.' 29 At most,
Walker's failure to obtain the insurance was an act of reckless disregard,
but such conduct is insufficient for the purposes of section 523(a)(6).' 8°
Prior to Walker, lower courts were in conflict over the application of
section 523(a)(6) to the failure of a debtor to obtain workers' compensation insurance.' 3 ' Walker now settles this issue, at least within the
Eleventh Circuit.
In Wolfson v. Equine Capital Corp. (In re Wolfson), 132 the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that a lender waived its right to bring a section
523(a)(6) discharge action for willful and malicious injury due to its
failure to take reasonable steps to protect its collateral.' 33 Stephen P.
Wolfson and his brother, Gary, were partners in a Florida horse farm,
and Equine Capital Corporation was the farm's primary lender. 34 As
security for the various loans made by Equine Capital, the partnership
In the course of its
pledged as collateral interests in the horses.'
business, the partnership routinely deposited proceeds from the sale of
collateralized horses into a general business account.'36 The business
paid to Equine Capital whatever it could on a monthly basis and added
the remaining amounts due to the total indebtedness. 37 Equine
127.

Id. at 1165.

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. In fact, lower courts within the Eleventh Circuit were divided on this issue. See,
e.g., Bailey v. Chatham (In re Bailey), 171 B.R. 703 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994); Hester v.
Saturday (In re Saturday), 138 B.R. 132 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991); Eaves v. Hampel (In re
Hampel), 110 B.R. 88 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1990); Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 36 BR.
588 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
132. 56 F.3d 52 (11th Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 54.
134. Id. at 53. The brothers entered into the loan transactions as general partners of
the business and as individual co-makers. Id. at 53 n.1.
135. Id. at 53.
136, Id.
137. Id.
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Capital was aware of this practice and continued extending credit to the
partnership." After the partnership went into default, the collateral
was sold, and Wolfson remained personally indebted to the lender for
well over $5,000,000.1"9
After Wolfson sought bankruptcy relief, Equine Capital commenced an
adversary proceeding seeking to avoid the discharge of its claim."4
Equine Capital alleged that Wolfson converted to his own use the
collateral and proceeds therefrom which had been pledged to the lender
on account of the loans."" The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the
creditor by concluding that Wolfson's retention of the proceeds from the
collateralized horses was a willful and malicious act that caused an
injury to Equine Capital. 42 The district court affirmed."
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed.'" In so doing, the
court made clear that every act of conversion does not necessarily result
in a willful and malicious injury.
Instead, the underlying circumstances may reveal an honest, but mistaken, belief on the part of the
debtor arising from the course of dealing between the parties which
makes the debtor believe that his actions do not violate the creditor's
rights.146 The course of dealing between Wolfson and Equine Capital
clearly indicated that the lender was well aware of and acquiesced to
Wolfson's business practice of depositing proceeds into the general
business account. 47 Despite this knowledge, Equine Capital continued
to extend credit to Wolfson's partnership instead of exercising whatever
rights it may have had regarding the disposition of the collateral. 1"
As a result, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Equine Capital's "failure
to take reasonable steps to protect its collateral" resulted in the waiver
of its right to assert a claim for willful and malicious injury under
section 523(a)(6).' 49 Thus, it was unnecessary to reach the question
of
150
whether Wolfson's conduct created a willful and malicious injury.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 53-54.

140. Id.
141. Id. at 54.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 55.
145. Id. at 54.
146. Id. (citing Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 332 (1934)).
147. Id. at 54-55.
148. Id.
149. Id at 55 (quoting Bank of Meeker v. McGinnis (Inre McGinnis), 586 F.2d 162, 163
(10th Cir. 1978)).
150. Id at 54.
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E.

Extension of Deadline for Filing Complaints
The question before the Eleventh Circuit in Marshall v. Demos (In re
Demos)151 was whether a creditor was entitled to rely on the bankruptcy court's order granting the trustee's motion to extend time for filing
complaints objecting to discharge and dishargeability of particular
debts." 2 After Menelaos P. Demos filed a Chapter 7 petition in
bankruptcy, February 8, 1993, was set as the deadline for filing such
complaints. 3 Many creditors, however, wished to examine Demos
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004'1 prior to deciding whether or not
to commence an adversary proceeding, and due to scheduling problems,
all examinations would not be completed prior to the filing deadline.155
In view of these potential problems, the trustee sought and received from
the bankruptcy court an extension of the deadline until March 15,
1993.156

Arthur R. Marshall was a creditor of Demos, and he filed an adversary
complaint on March 15, 1993.. 7 Despite having joined in the trustee's
request for extension of time, Demos filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint as being untimely, which the bankruptcy court granted." 8
The bankruptcy court found that Marshall had not filed his own motion
to extend time and concluded that he could not rely on the trustee's
motion.""s After the district court affirmed and Marshall appealed, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed."8 The court noted that the bankruptcy
court granted the motion for an extension pursuant to its equitable
powers under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. 161 The powers
provided to a bankruptcy court under this section are broad and include
granting relief to a party who did not specifically bring the motion. 2
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit found it entirely reasonable for
Marshall to rely on the bankruptcy court's order. Specifically, the

151. 57 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1995).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1038.
154.
155.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (Supp. 1996).
57 F.3d at 1038.

156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id
159. Id. at 1038-39.
160. Id. at 1040.
161. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1993). This provision grants the bankruptcy court broad powers
to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title.' Id.
162. 57 F.3d at 1039.
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trustee's motion to extend the time was served on Marshall, and by its
plain meaning the extension of time was granted for all creditors."s
While a creditor may not rely upon an order "that clearly has nothing to
do with him,"'" such was not the case with Marshall, and the Eleventh Circuit concluded that his complaint objecting to Demos' discharge
was timely filed.'"
Loss of Assets Priorto Bankruptcy
The question of a debtor's ability to satisfactorily explain the loss of
assets was the issue addressed in Hawley v. Cement Industries,Inc. (In
In 1989, Phillip E. Hawley signed a financial statement
re Hawley).
listing his total assets as $13,822,477, total liabilities as $1,876,814, and
a resulting'net worth of $11,945,663.167 In 1990, however, Hawley
filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in which he claimed less than
$20,000 in assets.'" Cement Industries, one of Hawley's creditors,
soon filed an adversary proceeding under section 727(a)(5) of the
Bankruptcy Code," urging the bankruptcy court to deny Hawley's
discharge based upon his failure to adequately explain the significant
loss of assets between the 1989 financial statement and the 1990
bankruptcy petition. 70
At the hearing before the bankruptcy court, Hawley testified that he
had worked for several years as a mortgage broker, preparing well over
one hundred financial statements during his lifetime. 171 As a result
of financial problems in the late 1980s, Hawley had to liquidate many
F

of his assets, but he kept no records of these transactions. 172 Further-

more, he testified that not all the values he had provided on the finance
statements were correct. 173 After considering this evidence, the

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1039-40.
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1039-40.
51 F.3d 246 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

167.

Id at 247.

168. Id.
169. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(5) (1993). According to this provision, the bankruptcy court
shall grant the debtor a discharge unless "the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily,

before determination of denial of discharge under this paragraph, any loss of assets or
deficiency of assets to meet the debtor's liabilities." I&
170. 51 F.3d at 247.
171. Id. at 248.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Cement Industries
by denying
174
affirmed.
court
district
the
and
discharge,
Hawley's
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Hawley first argued that Cement
Industries' failure to question him about the loss of assets prior to
commencing the adversary proceeding barred it from objecting to his
discharge. 7 , The court rejected this position after finding no language
in section 727(a)(5) explicitly requiring a creditor to call upon the debtor
to explain the loss of assets before filing a complaint.1 7 Next, Hawley
claimed that Cement Industries failed to carry its burden of proving its
objection to his discharge. 7 7 The court disagreed and found that
Cement Industries met its burden by showing the "vast discrepancies"
between Hawley's 1989 financial statement and his 1990 bankruptcy
petition. 171 Once Cement Industries made this showing, the burden
shifted to Hawley to satisfactorily explain the loss.' The bankruptcy
court found Hawley's testimony and lack of documentation unconvincing
on the issue, and that such a finding was not clearly erroneous."s For
this reason, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.''
The Eleventh Circuit's decision should come as no surprise, but its
discussion of the burden of proof is significant. Much is made of the
burden a creditor carries in objecting to a debtor's discharge, as
bankruptcy is a debtor's remedy. As demonstrated in Hawley, such a
burden may be minimal at best within the context of section 727(a)(5).
Thus, the fact that creditors carry the initial burden should not
discourage creditors from raising the objection.
VI.

CONFIRMATION

A.

Chapter 11 Good Faith Requirement
In McCormick v. Banc One Leasing Corp. (In re McCormick), 2 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that a debtor's assertion of his Fifth
Amendment'" privilege in a related adversary proceeding was not

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 249.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing In re Chalick, 748 F.2d 616, 619 (11th Cir. 1984)).
180. Id Because the bankruptcy court's ruling was a finding of fact, it could not be
overturned on appeal unless found to be clearly erroneous. Id. at 248.
181. Id. at 249.
182. 49 F.3d 1524 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
183. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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sufficient grounds on which to deny confirmation of his Chapter 11 plan
for lack of good faith.'"'
During the course of Timothy McCormick's bankruptcy case, a creditor
filed an adversary proceeding against him seeking to declare a debt
nondischargeable. 58 In a deposition related to the adversary, McCormick refused to testify by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' 5 ' Sometime thereafter, several creditors
filed objections in the bankruptcy case'to McCormick's plan, claiming
that it failed to satisfy the good faith requirement of section 1129(a)(3)
of the Bankruptcy Code."8 7 Yet the only reason cited for the objection
was McCormick's assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege.'5 ' The
bankruptcy court sustained the objections by concluding that a debtor's
failure to testify was contrary to the goals of the Bankruptcy Code, and
the district court affirmed.""
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[wihere the plan
is proposed with the legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize and
has a reasonable hope of success, the good faith requirements ... are
satisfied."'O The focus of a court's inquiry at the time of confirmation
is the plan itself, which requires the court to consider the circumstances
surrounding the plan while keeping in mind bankruptcy's purpose of
providing a debtor the opportunity to make a fresh start. 9' The
circumstances surrounding McCormick's proposed plan failed to suggest
the existence of any bad faith, with the exception of his failure to testify
in a related adversary proceeding." In fact, McCormick had complied
with all the necessary financial and disclosure requirements of Chapter
11. ' The court then pointed out that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code
or the case law allowed the denial of confirmation solely on the grounds

184. 49 F.3d at 1525-26.
185. Id. at 1526.
186. Id. It is not clear from the Eleventh Circuit's opinion what the facts were
underlying the adversary proceeding or the reasons for McCormick's invocation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
187. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1993). According to section 1129(a), the bankruptcy
court shall confirm the Chapter 11 plan if certain requirements are met, including if the
"plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law." Id.
188. 49 F.3d at 1527.

189. Id.
190. Id. at 1526.

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. For example, McCormick filed all the schedules and statements of financial
affairs and testified at the meeting of creditors. The bankruptcy court approved his
disclosure statement, and McCormick secured the necessary number of ballots by creditors
favoring the plan. Id.
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of a debtor's refusal to testify in a related proceeding on Fifth Amendment grounds."M In view of these facts, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that McCormick's refusal to testify cannot itself be the basis for
denying confirmation of his plan so long as his conduct did not impede
the basic administration of his bankruptcy case.'9
B. Mootness and Chapter 13 Confirmation
The question presented to the Eleventh Circuit in Russo v. Seidler (In
re Seidler)'" was whether an appeal from a bankruptcy court order in
an adversary proceeding removing a purchase money mortgage holder's
rendered moot by confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13
lien was
97
plan.1

Thomas and Dorothy Russo filed a claim against Marion Seidler in his
bankruptcy case for amounts Seidler allegedly owed them on a purchase
Seidler, however, disputmoney mortgage on a home in New York.'
ed the validity of the Russos' mortgage ien.' The bankruptcy court
found that the lien had already been satisfied, and the Russos appealed
to the district court.2" After doing so, they obtained an order granting
a stay of confirmation of Seidler's Chapter 13 plan pending the
appeal." 1 The stay, however, was conditioned upon the Russos'
posting of a $50,000 bond; when they failed to do so, the bankruptcy
court confirmed the plan.20 2 Then, on Seidler's motion, the district
court dismissed the appeal upon the conclusion that the issues were
moot in view of confirmation.2 3
The central finding of mootness is a determination that effective
judicial relief is no longer available. 2 Thus, the issue framed before
the Eleventh Circuit was whether the Russos had available to them
effective judicial relief notwithstanding plan confirmation should they
prevail on the merits of their appeal. 20 In dismissing the appeal, the

194. Id.
195. Id. at 1527.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

44 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 946.
Id.
Id.
Id at 946-47.
Id. at 947,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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district court relied upon section 1327 of the Bankruptcy Code, to
conclude that the Russos were bound by the terms of the confirmed
Chapter 13 plan which made no provisions for the treatment of their
claim. 7 The Eleventh Circuit agreed that under section 1327, a
confirmed plan has res judicata effect on certain issues, but this view
applied only to issues "which were or should have been addressed in the
confirmation process."2 There was no authority in either the case law
or the Bankruptcy Code to lend credence to the idea that confirmation
would moot an appeal of issues that were not decided within the context
of confirmation.'°
The dispute between Seidler and the Russos pertained to whether
Seidler had satisfied the purchase money mortgage lien on his home,
and confirmation did not address this question. Should the Russos
prevail on the merits of their case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that they
would be able to enforce their lien against Seidler's property.210 Thus,
relief remained available to the Russos, thereby causing their appeal to
continue to be justiciable. 1'
VII.

JURISDICTION

A.

Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
A bankruptcy court's jurisdiction was at issue when the Eleventh
Circuit decided Community Bank of Homestead v. Boone (In re
Boone).2 12 Daniel and Sara Boone were individually liable to Community Bank of Homestead for business and home loans totalling close to
$100,000.213 In 1989, they contracted to sell their house for $91,000
and then immediately filed for bankruptcy. 214 After their petition, but
before closing on the house, Community Bank sent the closing agent two
estoppel letters claiming an excess of $97,000 of the proceeds from the
impending sale. 2 5 Because it appeared to the Boones after these

206.

11 U.S.C. § 1327 (1993). According to this statute, the "provisions of a confirmed

plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is
provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted,
or has rejected the plan." Id.
207. 44 F.3d at 947-48.
208. Id. at 948.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 949.
211. Id.

212. 52 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 1995).
213. Id. at 959.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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letters that they would receive no proceeds from the sale, they refused
to complete the closing.21 Nevertheless, they brought an adversary
proceeding against Community Bank alleging tortious interference with
contract regarding the sale of the house.2 17 The bankruptcy court
awarded the Boones $10,199 in actual damages and $30,596 in punitive
damages, and the district court affirmed on appeal.2 1
On further appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of the case on
jurisdictional grounds. For federal bankruptcy jurisdiction to exist, a
case must at a minimum "relate to" a case under Title 11.219 A civil
proceeding is related to a case under Title 11 if
the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have an effect on the
estate being administered in bankruptcy ....

An action is related to

bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities,
options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and which
in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the
bankrupt estate.2 °
Even under this broad definition ofbankruptcyjurisdiction, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the Boones' claim against Community Bank did
not relate to its bankruptcy case.221 The conduct that gave rise to
their claim arose after they filed their petition in bankruptcy, so any
damages they received would belong solely to them and not be included
in estate property. 222 Furthermore, the Boones' claim against Commu-

nity Bank was not a core proceeding over which federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction would exist.2 1s The existence of common issues of fact
between the tortious interference claim and the other bankruptcy related
claims was no justification in itself to make the matter a core proceeding.' Also, the mere fact that the Boones were debtors in bankruptcy

216. Id.

217. Id. at 960. The Boones' adversary also sought a determination of the extent of
Community Bank's lien on the house and an order compelling the Bank to accept that

amount in satisfaction of the lien. Id.
218. Id. See Community Bank v. Boone (In re Boone), 164 B.R. 167 (S.D. Fla. 1994),
reu'd, 52 F.3d 958 (11th Cir. 1995).
219. 52 F.3d at 960 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1993)).
220. Id. (quoting Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 788
(11th Cir. 1990), quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).

221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1993).
52 F.3d at 961 (citing Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d

784, 789 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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did not make their claim a core proceeding.225 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.226
Boone certainly is an important case that defines federal bankruptcy
jurisdiction. While bankruptcy's core and "related to" jurisdiction are
very broad in scope, Boone makes it clear that bankruptcy is not a
clearinghouse for any and all claims that a debtor may have.
B. Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate court jurisdiction was at issue in Lockwood v. Snookies, Inc.
(In re FD.R. Hickory House, Inc.).2 7 Plaintiff Bryan Lockwood
incorporated the debtor, F.D.R. Hickory House, Inc., for the purpose of
purchasing several restaurants in Georgia from the defendants,
Snookies, Inc., and others.'s
After the sale, however, Snookies
brought a state court fraud and conversion action against F.D.R. Hickory
House, Lockwood, and others, eventually winning a $16,000,000
judgment. 229 At some time after the commencement of the state court
action but prior to the entry of judgment, F.D.R. Hickory House filed for
bankruptcy.2 3 ° After entry of the judgment, the bankruptcy trustee
signed a proposed settlement and release agreement with Lockwood to
settle all possible claims of the debtor against Lockwood.2"' The
agreement, however, purported to enjoin Snookies and all the other state
court plaintiffs from enforcing their $16,000,000 judgment against
Lockwood.3 2 Upon the objection of Snookies, the bankruptcy court
refused to approve the settlement agreement, because it would enjoin
enforcement of claims that were not part of the debtor's estate.' The
district court affirmed.'
When Lockwood appealed further, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of the
case on procedural grounds rather than making a decision on the
merits. 2 5 The court initially noted that its appellate jurisdiction was
limited to only final judgments and orders entered by the district

225. Id.
226. Id.

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

60 F.3d 724 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court.2
A final decision "'is one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."237 The Eleventh Circuit panel concluded that the district
court's refusal to approve the settlement agreement was not a final
order, because it did not settle the issue of23 the potential liabilities
between Lockwood and F.D.R. Hickory House. 8
VIII.

THE TRUSTEE'S RECOVERY POWERS: RATE UNDERCHARGE

CLAIMS
In Whitaker v. Power Brake Supply, Inc. (In re Olympia Holding
Corp.),239 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Negotiated Rates Act
of 1993"4 barred a bankruptcy trustee's undercharge claim against a
shipper.241 The NRA provides relief to shippers facing these claims by
exempting small business from undercharge liability. 42 The trustee
argued that this exemption was precluded from application in bankruptcy by virtue of sections 363(1) and 541(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. 24
Through section 363(1), the Bankruptcy Code renders unenforceable laws
that limit a trustee's right to use, sell or lease estate property because
of the debtor's financial condition.' 4 Furthermore, section 541(c)(1)
236. Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1993)). In contrast, the court noted that district
courts had discretionary jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the
bankruptcy court. Id. (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1993 & Supp. 1995)).
237. Id. at 726 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229,233 (1945) and Hatcher
v. Miller (In re Red Carpet Corp.), 902 F.2d 883, 890 (11th Cir. 1990)).
238. Id. What remains unanswered, however, is what exactly is left for determination
by the district and bankruptcy courts. The bankruptcy court did not dispute the trustee's
proposal to settle claims against Lockwood for the sum of $7,650. Instead, the dispute
arose over the trustee's attempt to enjoin Snookies and the other state court plaintiffs from
enforcing their judgment against Lockwood. In fact, the bankruptcy and district court had
already made the determination that such claims were not part of the debtor's estate and
could not be -settled by the trustee. Id.
239. 68 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1995).
240. Pub. L. No. 103-180, 107 Stat. 2044 (partially codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10701(f)
(1995)) [hereinafter "NRA"].
241. 68 F.3d at 1305. An undercharge claim is an attempt to recover the difference
between a carrier's rate filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the lower rate
the carrier negotiated with the shipper. See generally Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, 497
U.S. 116 (1990) (holding that shippers could be held liable for the difference between the
negotiated rate and the filed rate). Rate undercharge claims have generated much
litigation due to the large number of interstate carriers that have filed for bankruptcy since
the late 1980s. For examples of this problem, see Scroggins v. Southern Wipers, Inc. (In
re Brown Transport Truckload, Inc.), 176 B.R. 82 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1994), and the cases
cited therein.
242. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701(f)(9) (1995).
243. 68 F.3d at 1306; 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(1), 541(c)(1) (1993).
244. 68 F.3d at 1307 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(1)).
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prohibits the enforcement of laws that would prevent property from
becoming part of the estate in bankruptcy due to the debtor's financial
condition.245 In contrast, the NRA operates to insulate shippers from
liability in cases where the interstate carrier is no longer transporting
According to the trustee, the "no longer transporting
property.4
property" language of the NRA prefaces the applicability of its provisions
upon the interstate carrier's financial condition.24 7
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the trustee's argument for two reasons.
First, the court concluded that the application of the NRA is not
contingent on the debtor's financial condition.4 The language regarding a carrier that "is no longer transporting property" is a reference to
the carrier's operational status which is distinct from the carrier's
financial condition. 240 Therefore, sections 363(1) and 541(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code do not prevent the application of the NRA to insulate
a shipper from undercharge liability.25 ° Second, the court pointed out
that the application of the small business defense upon which the
shipper relied in this case is not conditioned upon the carrier's operational status.251 While other exceptions found in the NRA require the
shipper to show that the carrier is no longer transporting property, the
small business exception contains no such requirement. 25 2 Therefore,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the NRA properly barred the
trustee's undercharge claim. 2 3 This decision is significant in that it
should dispose of the many rate undercharge claims that have clogged
federal courts in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia for the better part of
this decade.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)).
Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10701(f)(1)).
68 F,3d at 1306-07.
Id. at 1307-08.

249. Id. at 1308.
250. Id. at 1309.
251.
252.

Id. at 1308.
Id.

253. Id. at 1309. The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits reached the same conclusions
in 1995. See Cooper v. B & L, Inc. (In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc.), 66 F.3d 1390 (4th Cir.
1995); Gumport v. Sterling Press (In re Transcon Lines), 58 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1016 (1996); and Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Whittier Wood Prod. Co. (In
re Jones Truck Lines, Inc.), 57 F.3d 642 (8th Cir. 1995).
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IX. SANCTIONS
In the case of Glatter v. Mroz (In re Mroz),5 the Eleventh Circuit
issued an important decision on the question of Rule 9011 sanctions.2 5
The bankruptcy court imposed sanctions against the trustee's law firm
and one of its associates in favor of the ex-wife of the debtor David G.
Mroz. 2' The trustee filed a preference avoidance complaint against
257
Mroz's former spouse, but the bankruptcy court later dismissed it.
After dismissing the action, the court imposed sanctions because the
trustee proceeded to trial on the basis of a simple affidavit which did not
identify the date of the alleged transfer, the debt the transfer was to
repay, or the manner in which the transfer was made. 28 Also, the
bankruptcy court was bothered by the fact that for two and a half years
after the trustee filed the complaint, no attempts were made to discover
any additional evidence to support the allegations contained therein.5 9
After the district court affirmed the sanctions, the trustee's law firm
appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit which reversed and remanded the
28
case.
Rule 9011 authorizes sanctions "when (1) the papers are frivolous,
legally unreasonable or without factual foundation, or (2) the pleading
is filed in bad faith or for an improper purpose."6 The issue before
the Eleventh Circuit in Mroz was whether the trustee's complaint was
legally unreasonable and without factual foundation, because it was
based on the debtor's simple affidavit.6 2 The court noted that its focus
under Rule 9011 is what was known by the signing attorney at the time
the complaint was filed.2 ' Prior to commencing the preference action,
the trustee had several discussions with his counsel and the debtor
about the alleged preferential transfers.2
Under penalty of perjury,
the debtor prepared an affidavit containing factual allegations which, if
true, would establish the necessary elements of a preferential transfer

254.

65 F.3d 1567 (11th Cir. 1995).

255.

FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (Supp. 1996). Because the language of Rule 9011 closely

follows the language of FED. R. Cim. P. 11, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mroz has

significant implications in all civil cases.
256. 65 F.3d at 1571.
257. Id. at 1570-71.
258. Id at 1571.
259. Id.
260. I& at 1576-77.
261. Id at 1572.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1573.
264. Id. at 1573-74.
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to the debtor's ex-wife.2 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that even
though this information may have been insufficient to succeed at trial,
it was sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 9011 and warrant the
Consequently, the trustee's complaint
filing of the complaint.'
against the debtor's former wife was reasonably interposed, and the
bankruptcy court's sanctions were improper. 7
While concluding that the trustee's attorneys met the low threshold
requirements of Rule 9011, the Eleventh Circuit's inquiry did not end
there. - It continued by recognizing a bankruptcy court's inherent power
In order to exercise its
to impose sanctions outside of Rule 9011.2
inherent power and impose sanctions, however, the bankruptcy court
would have to make a finding of subjective bad faith.2' At issue in
Mroz was the lack of action on the part of the trustee and his law firm
If the trustee's postfiling
once the preference complaint was filed.
conduct was made in bad faith, the sanctions would be justified.2
Nevertheless, the accused parties were entitled to due process, which
required fair notice that the conduct may warrant sanctions, and the
opportunity to respond either orally or in writing to justify the conduct
in question.27 2 Because the bankruptcy court had not afforded the
trustee and his law firm an opportunity to defend their conduct, the
evidentiary hearing to
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case for an 273
determine if the parties had acted in bad faith.

265.
(1993).
266.
267.
268,
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1574. For the elements of a preferential transfer, see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1575.
Id. at 1576.
Id.
Id. at 1575-76.
Id. at 1576-77.

